Firstly I characterize Simple Partial Logic (=SPL) as a generalization and extension of a certain two-valued logic. Based on that characterization I present two definitions of validity in SPL. Secondly I show that given my characterization these two definitions are more appropriate than other definitions that have been prevalent, since both have some desirable semantic properties that the others lack.
Introduction
Partial logic is, broadly speaking, logic that allows the truth-value gap, which means that propositions may possibly be neither true nor false. Because of the gap, there occur, as it were, two conceptions of truth: being true and being not false. I call the former the strong concept of truth and the latter the weak concept of truth.
Accordingly the conceptions of validity also have similar complexity. There are strong and weak concepts of validity of a formula: being true and being not false respectively under all truth-valuations. As for the validity of an argument there can be at least four concepts:(1) (a) The consequence is true whenever all the premises are true.
(b) The consequence is not false whenever all the premises are true.
(c) The consequence is true whenever no premises are false.
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As for the semantics there are two conditions that SPL should satisfy:
1. It is truth-functional(4). 2. It has another value (in a broader sense described below) than truth and falsity . These operators are common in that they always bring about a truth-value under partial valuation. In my view, they express a kind of (extensional) modality which results from partial valuation. I call the operators which always bring about a truth-value under partial valuation the 'modal operators' (In the following I call the formulae that do not include modal operators 'basic formulae'). Adding these operators to the basic operators makes SPL an extension of some total two-valued logic as well as its generalization. Though the modal operators destroy the monotonicity of partial logic, I do not think that they make the 'spirit' of partial logic totally lost, for the monotonicity still remains at the basic level and it is no wonder that the propositions which describe the modal facts in terms of partiality itself are non-monotonic. Partiality implies that there are cases where a gapped proposition gets a truth-value by adding partial logic, on the other hand, there is another axis of valuation presupposed: whether a formula has a truth-value or not. I give other definitions here:
Weak Formula: the formula which does not always have a truth-value under partial valuation Strong Formula: the formula which always has a truth-value under partial valua tion
We have to take both of these axes into consideration when we define the concept of validity. For example, we should distinguish between the following concepts of validity of a formula (these are respectively the explanatory meanings of 'C is true or gapped' and 'C is true' in the above definitions (1c) and (2c).):
Weak Tautology: the Formula which is always true if it has a truth-value Strong Tautology: the Formula which always has a truth-value and is always true Considering these points, the explanatory meaning of weak and strong validity of arguments are as follows ((b) is logically equivalent to (a)):
< Weak Validity> (a) Whenever all the premises have a truth-value and are true, the consequence is, if it has a truth-value, true.
(b) If all the formulae in the argument have a truth-value, whenever all the premises are true, the consequence is true. <Strong Validity> (a) Whenever all the premises that have a truth-value are true, the consequence has a truth-value and is true. (b) At least one formula in the argument always has a truth-value.
Among the formulae that have a truth-value, whenever all the premises are true, the consequence is true. 
